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In the aftennatll of the September 11,2001 attacks and 
the subsequent mail-borne anthrax attack of October 2001, 
it has become dear that health care providers may be 
called upon to respond to victims of terrorism. Biological 
terrorism (Bl), in particular, involves the use of virulent 
agents with the intent to cause mass casualties and/or in-
duce fear, a scenario that if effected will severely strain the 
capacity of regional emergency medical services and pose 
unique management challenges to c;linicians confronted 
with victimized children. Whether practicing as a pediatric 
emergency medicine specialist working in an urban chil-
dren's hospital or as a general clinician in private office-
based practice, pediatridans may be the first to suspect 
that a BY agent may have been utilized. Compared to adults, 
most caregivers have a relatively low threshold for haVing 
children and infants evaluated professionally when they 
become sick. Furthermore, pediatric patients may have a 
more rapid or severe response to a biological agent, poten-
tially putting pediatridans and child care providers in the 
critical position of being the first to diagnose an exposure. 
The clinician's response to such a situation may determine 
whether the incident is controlled promptly or whether it 
evolves into a large-scale epidemiologic catastrophe. 
Significant resources have become available in recent 
years if suspicion arises that a BT event has occurred. 
Involving in-hospital infectious disease specialists is an 
important first step. Local health departments can also 
provide guidance with information, testing, and response, 
and will typically be the liaison to any state and federal 
resources that may need to become involved. 
Any patient suspected of baving been exposed to a 
BT agent, regardless of whether it was intentional or ac-
cidental, will necessitate specific isolation, treatment, and 
personal protective needs for the staff who will likely 
require expert consultation if it is available. There are 
also mandatory and immediate reporting requirements 
for all of these agents discussed in this chapter. 
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The evaluation of a pediatric patient exposed to an 
unknown terrorist agent benefits from an organized ap-
proach and a bas.c knowledge of the time frame of the 
various biological and chemical substance which may be 
involved. In general, chemical agents (e.g., nerve agents, 
cyanide) produce symptoms which evolve quickly, while 
BT agents typically take more time to affect their ex-
posed patient. Challenging the clinician is the fact that 
many BT agents also share the common denominator of 
having a prodromal phase which mimics common ill-
nesses such as influenza or pneumonia. As is true for the 
evaluation of any illness, a detailed history and physical 
examination will help guide the evaluation of the possi-
bly exposed patient. Table 37-1 offers a diagnostic ap-
proach that emphasizes some of the classic findings of 
the major chemical and biological agents. It is like the 
astute clinician with an eye for the unusual epidemio-
logic characteristics of a BT incident that will first con-
sider the diagnosis. 
There are several methods used to categorize BT 
agents. They can be grouped and discussed by type (bac-
teria, virus, and toxin) as this chapter does, by the likeli-
hood of their use due to availability, or by relative risk 
based on both availability and pathogenicity. The follow-
ing sections focus on the biological agents that are con-
sidered "Category A" by the Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention (CDC), meaning that they are thought to 
pose the highest risk to victims based on their relative 
ease of dissemination and their potential to cause exten-
sive fatalities as well as social disruption. 
Anthrax is caused by a gram-positive, encapsulated, 
aerobic, stable, spore-forming rod bacterium. In nature, it 
exists primarily as a zoonotic pathogen in herbivores, 
and cases are occasionally seen in humans who work in 
the outdoors or with animals. Most commonly this is 
seen as a cutaneous infection, although inhalational dis-
ease C\Voolsorters' disease) can occur. 
Anthrax is of considerable concern and represents 
one of the most likely agents of terror or warfare be-
cause of its stability. Anthrax spores to be used as a 
weapon would likely be dried for dispersion. Bioterror-
ism experts believe that its use as an effective BT agent 
would reqUire sophisticated facilities for preparation. 
With the proper resources, anthrax can be engineered 
to be antibiotic-resistant. The source of the mail-borne 
anthrax used in the United States in the fall of 2001 has 
never been elucidated, although there is concern that it 
may have been stolen from an Army biodefense facility. 
This attack resulted in 22 cases, 11 cutaneous and 
11 inhalational, resulting in 5 deaths from among the 
latter cohort. 
Anthrax is a potent pathogen in its aerosolized form. 
In 1979, an inadvertent release of spores from a covert 
bioweapon facility in SverdIovsk, USSR, caused nearly 
100 infections downwind with a case fatality rate of up 
to 86%. The agent may pose an additional risk to infants 
and young children because of their proximity to the 
ground and because of their hand-to-mouth behavior, 
they may be at a higher risk of contacting, ingesting, or 
inhaling spores in a contaminated area. 
Pathogenesis 
The spores can be spread through direct contact, 
food contamination, and aerosolization. Anthrax can 
infect open skin at areas of broken integument and can 
be inhaled or ingested. Although human-to-human trans-
mission is possible in its cutaneous form, it is otherwise 
not _ contagious. 
Clinical Presentation 
Cutaneous anthrax is the most common presentation 
in naturally occurring disease. The incubation period is 
approximately 1 week, at which point the source of in-
fection develops into a painless vesicular lesion followed 
by a coal-black eschar. There is a possibility of a lethal 
systemic dissemination of the disease, although this is 
much less commonly seen. 
The only known pediatric case of cutaneous anthrax: 
from a biological attack was from the U.S. anthrax mail 
attacks in 2001. A 7 -month-old infant who had been pre-
sumed to have a brown recluse spider bite with superim-
posed cellulitis tested positive for anthrax (Figure 37-1). 
Investigation revealed that the infant had been taken to 
visit his relative at a media outlet that was later confinned 
to be contaminated by anthrax. Although the infant did 
display some evidence of a systemic illness with reve~ 
hemolysis, thrombocytopenia, and renal insufficiency, he 
was subsequently discharged in stable condition after 
antibiotic treatment. 
Inhalational disease as well as cutaneous anthrax 
would likely be seen after an offensive attack, as was 
appreciated in 200 I when spores were disseminated in 
the U.S. mail. The incubation time is typically 1 to " days 
but may be as long as 6 weeks in some cases. In its ":j.1tial 
stages, it is difficult to differentiate from common illt,-~~sses. 
There is a gradual onset of fever, malaise, cough, fatigue, 
and occasionaily chest pain. There is typicaily a lack 
rhinorrhea, and the cough is nonproductive. After thiS 
prodromal illness, there may be a transient improvement 
for a few days followed by a sudden developmen' "f se-
vere respiratory symptoms to include dyspnea, d'~_Fnore­
sis, cyanosis, and stridor. In approximately half of the 
severe hemorrhagic meningitis may ensue. 
anthrax has a high case fatality rate, as mentloned. Pn)m()t' 
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Table 37-1 Diagnostic -Approach-to the P~tti~_pat~ent "'~t~ s~;pe:;:'<!-~iF;~~~~-~~~1.:,~ --- -
~ ~ ~ ~ '""~ ~~ ~~ ;:-~ 
History 
Epidemiologic factors: epidemic numbers of patients, exposure history, exotic disea..<;e presentations? 
• Acuity of onset? 
• Febrile prodrome? 
Physical examination 
• Vital signs 
• Syndromic pattern: respiratory, neurologic, or dermatologic? 
Laboratory assessment 
Chest radiograph 
Complete blood count 
Coagulation studies (for purpura, hemorrhagic diathesis) 
Further definitive tests, after consultation with infectious disease, toxicology experts; local health department, CDC (1-770-488-71 00), 
Poison Control Center, etc. 
Syndrome evaluation 
Acute onset (seconds to minutes), afebrile: chemical agents 
Respiratory syndrome 
Nerve agents (organophosphates): dyspnea, rhinorrhea, wheezing, rales, coma, seizures 
Chlorine: eye, nose, throat irritation, progressing to wheezing 
Phosgene: wheezing, pulmonary edema (onset over several hours) 
Neurologic syndrome 
Nerve agents (organophosphates): cholinergic syndrome (miOSiS, rhinorrhea, lacrimation, dyspnea, wheezing, and rales).progressing to 
coma, seizures, paralysis, apnea 
Cyanide: tachypnea, apnea, coma, seizures 
Derniatologic syndrome 
Vesicants (mustard, arsenicals): erythema, vesicles, ocular inflammation after a few hours (with respiratory tract inflammatiolJ. in severe 
cases) 
Subacute onset (days), febrile: biological agents 
Respiratory syndrome 
Anthrax, inhalationa1: febrile prodrome, chest pain; widened mediastinum ± infiltrates, pleural effusions, hi.tar adenopathy on chest radiograph; 
cyanosis, shock, meningitis 
Plague, pneumOnic: febrile prodrome, then fulminant pneumonia (typically with bloody sputum), bilateral infiltrates on clIest radiograph; 
sepsis, DIC 
Tularemia, pneumonic: abmpt onset fever, then fulminant pneumonia; hilar adenopathy; pleural effusions on chest radiograph 
Neurologic syndrome 
Botulism: afebrile; bulbar dysfunction, progressive descending flaccid paralysis, intact sensation, and mental status; CSF negative 
Dermatologic syndrome 
Anthrax, cutaneous: p'Wu1e progressing to vesicle, then ulcer; then black, depressed eschar, with marked surrounding edema, typically relatively 
painless 
Smallpox: febii.J.e prodrome: centrifugal; synchronous vesiculopustular exanthem 
Plague, septicemia: febrile prodrome, often with prominent gastrointestinal symptoms, then shock, petecN-ae, purpura, gangrene 
Viral hemorrhagic fevers: febrile prodrome, with rapid progression to shock, purpura, bleeding diathesis 
'Particularly regarding syndromes caused by aerosol exposure. 
DIC, Disseminated intrJ.vascular coagulation, CSP, cerebrospinal fluid. 
From Henretig FM, Cieslak T), Eitzen EM )r: Biological and chemical terrorism.) Pediatr 2002;141 :311-326, with permiSSion. 
and aggtessive treatment and a high index of suspi~ion are 
necessary to maximize the patient's survivability. 
Gastrointestinal (GJ) anthrax also has an approxi-
mately I-week incubation period before the develop-
ment of GI symptoms such as nausea and anorexia, as 
well as fever. This may progtess to abdominal pain, he-
matemesis, and bloody diarrhea. 
Oropharyngeal anthrax is much less common and 
presents as unilateral or bilateral lymphadenopathy, 
which can be painful and impede the airway. There may 
also be symptoms including dysphagia and ulcerous le-
sions in the mouth and on the tongue. 
Diagnosis and Laboratory Findings 
In inhalational or GI disease, a Gram stain and routine 
blood culture may reveal bacteria in its desporulated 
form. Similarly, cerebrospinal fluid (CSF) may reveal 
B. anthracis in meningitis. A cutaneous swab of vesicular 
fluid of a lesion may demonstrate B. anthracis. 
Anthrax toxin production occurs simultaneously to 
bacteremia and is detectable by specific test. 
A chest film may show the classic widened medias-
tinum of anthrax as well as pleural effusion and/or 
infiltrate. 
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Figure 37-1 Seven-montll-old infant diagnosed with cutaneOllS 
anthrax after the 2001 U.S. mail attack. Note the dark eschar in (he 
top figure, classic for this disease. From Roche et al. Cutaneous an-
thrax infection. NEJM 2001;345(22):1611. 
Nasal swabs may be used for epidemiologic data col-
lection, but not for the diagnosis of suspect cases. 
Differential Diagnosis 
Cutaneous anthrax is important to differentiate from 
tularemia, staphylococcal or streptococcal skin infection, 
and tbe brown recluse spider bite. Any painless coal-
black lesion should prompt the conSideration of a test 
for anthrax. 
Inhalational anthrax patients are typically not die,,-
nosed until the disease has progressed to life-threatenil'.g 
stages, because its initial symptoms are so similar to 
many common respiratory illnesses. Advanced disease 
may mimic a dissecting/ruptured aortic aneurysm or the 
superior vena cava syndrome. 
Gastrointestinal anthrax is commonly mistaken k)f 
gastroenteritis, an acute abdomen, or food poisoning' 
Management 
Therapy 
In active disease, ciprofloxacin 10 mg/kgidose IV 
q12h (max 400 mgidose) or doxycycline 2.2 mg/kgi 
dose IV q12h (max 100 mgidose) are considered first 
line therapy for anthrax. Expert consultation is advised, 
as the use of additional antibiotics may be recom-
mended. Altbough both ciprofloxacin and doxycycline 
are relatively contraindicated in the pediatric patient, 
their use is warranted if anthrax is suspected. Treatment 
is continued with such multiple antibiotics by the par-
enteral route until the patient's condition has stabilized, 
and then oral antibiotics are continued for 2 months. 
Therapy must be aggreSSive and broad spectrum until 
susceptibilities are obtained in the appropriate labora-
tory faciliry. 
Postexposure prophylaxis against anthrax can also be 
accomplished with ciprofloxacin or doxycycline. If the 
organism proves susceptible, amoxicillin may be 
tuted (Table 37-2). 
Aggressive treatment should be instituted as soon 
disease is suspected. Most inhalational cases are 
despite treatment. Cutaneous anthrax has a 20% me"','!; 
ity rate if untreated, and tbe GI case fatality r>,' 
proximately 50%. 
Vaccination is possible for adults at high risk of 
sure such as soldiers or animal workers. 
Plague is a gram-negative, rod-shaped, nonH)Ol:Ui< 
ing bacterium existing as a zoonotic pathogen in 
dents, with fleas as the primary vector 
humans. Infected cats may also transmit the 
to humans. Plague is enzootic in the southwestern 
United States, where naturally-occuring cases are peri-
odically seen. 
Plague is one of the original biological agents used 
in aggression. As early as the 13th and 14th centuries, 
diseased corpses were used as projectiles with the 
intent to spread diseases. Plague, or the "Black Death," 
was notably among them. It is a highly contagious 
and lethal disease that killed approximately one fourth 
of the European population in the 14th century. 
Hundreds of years later, ceramic "flea bombs" were re-
portedly dropped by tbe Japanese on the Chinese by 
air in the early 1940s with the intent of spreading 
plague. 
Pathogenesis 
Plague is ktiown in two forms: bubonic and pneu-
monic. Bubonic plague is typically caused by fleas that 
have fed on infected animals. It may progress to second-
ary pneumonic or septicemic plague. Bubonic plague is 
the form of disease that is most often seen in naturally 
acquired illness. 
Pneumonic plague in its primary form (not preceded 
by bubonic disease) would be seen if Y. pestis was used 
as an aerosolized weapon. In contrast to anthrax, plague 
is highly contagious, making it an especially dangerous 
BT agent that can cause a widespread outbreak from hu-
man to human transmission. No cases of pneumonic 
plague have been recoguized in the United States iu 
SO years. 
Clinical Presentation 
Bubonic plague has an incubation period of 2 to 
10 days before the acute onset of nonspecific symptoms 
such as high temperature, malalse, myalgias, headache, 
and nausea and vomiting. Painful lymphadenopathy (the 
"bubo") develops concurrently or shortly thereafter in 
the extremity that has been bitten. The patient may have 
a palpable or palnful liver and/or spleen, and may de-
velop various skin lesions in lymphatic drainage area of 
the bubo. 
Septicemic plague represents a secondary infection in 
some of those who develop bubonic or pneumonic plague. 
It presents in a fashion similar to gram-negative sepsis with 
hypotension, high temperature, chills, nausea, vomiting, 
and diarrhea. Patients may also develop acral thromboses, 
necrosis, gangrene, and disseminated intravascular coagu-
lopathy (DIC) as part of endotoxin release. About 1 in 
20 persons with septicemic plague will develop subse-
quent plague meningitis. 
Pneumonic plague presents after an incubation pe-
riod of 1 to 6 days in primary disease, longer in second-
ary. There is typically a rapid onset of severe respiratory 
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symptoms such as high temperature, chills, malaise, myal-
gias, and headache. This is followed a day later by the 
te~tale bloody sputum and cough, as well as nausea, 
vomiting, and diarrhea. The sputum findings are classic 
for this disease. 
Diagnosis and Laboratory Findings 
The initial diagnosis of plague is guided by clinical 
impreSSion. Bubonic plague should be suspected based 
on the cutaneous findings and history. Lymph node aspi-
rate reveals a "safety pin" stained bipolar bacillus. In 
pneumoniC plague, chest x-ray study typically shows bi-
lateral infiltrates. Laboratory findings typically include 
leukocytosis and a bandemia with greater than SO% poly-
morphonuclear leukocytes (PMNs). DIC and laboratory 
results suggestive of organ failure may be present in pro-
gressive disease. Have a high index of suspicion for pneu-
monic plague when presented with muitiple patients 
with pneumonia and bemoptysis. 
The organism grows slowly in routine culture me-
dium, which may hinder diagnosis. Immunofluorescent 
Y. pestis Fl antigen titers are necessary to confirm the 
diagnosis. 
Differential Diagnosis 
Cutaneous disease presents with a unique presenta-
tion of lymph node findings. Because of the incubation 
period, a travel history is important, even in areas where 
enzootic disease is not present. There have been two 
recent cases of bubonic plague diagnosed in New York 
City from travelers who had been in the U.S. Southwest 
on vacation. 
Pneumonic plague can be mistaken for any of the 
more common diseases of respiratory distress and fever, 
such as community-acquired pneumonia, hantavirus pul-
monary syndrome, meningococcemia, rickettsiosis, riCin, 
or staphylococcal enterotoxin B (SEB) exposure. 
Management 
In active cases, promptly initiated therapy is essential, 
especially for pneumonic plague, for which the mortality 
rate is nearly 100% in untreated disease. Gentamicin 
therapy shouid be initiated at 2.5 mg/kg/dose IV /1M qSh 
(not to exceed 300 mg/day) OR doxycycline 2.2 mg/kg/ 
dose IV q12h (not to exceed a IOO-mg dose) OR strepto-
mycin 15 mg/kg 1M twice daily. 
For postexposure propbylaxis, doxycycline 2.2 mg/ 
kg PO twice daily (max dose 100 mg) for 1 week is 
recommended, or consider ciprofloxaCin, tetracycline, 
or chloramphenicol. 
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Ciprofloxacin: 10 mg/kg 
(max 400 mg) IV 
ql2h 
OR 
Doxycycline: 2.2 mg/kg 
(max 100 mg) IV 
q12ht 
Gentamicin: 2.S mg/kg 
IVq8h 
OR 
Doxycycline: 2.2 mg/kg 






Ciprofloxacin: 15 mg/kg 
(max 500 mg) PO BID 
x 60 days 
OR 
Doxycycline: 2.2 mg/kg (max 
100 mg) PO BID 
x 60 days* 
Doxycycline: 2.2 mg/kg (max 
100 mg) PO BID x 7 days 
OR 
Ciprofloxacin: 20 rug/kg (max 
SOD mg) PO BID x 7 days 
OR 
Chloramphenicol: 25 mg/kg 
(max 1 g) PO BID x 7 days 
Vaccination within 4 days 
(consider vaccinia immune 
globulin: 0.6 mLlkg 1M 














Tularemia Frantisella Pneumonic: abrupt- 2 to 10 days Blood, Culture Standard Gentamicin: 2.5 mg/kg Doxycycline: 2.2 mg/kg (max 
tularensts onset fever, fulminant Sputum Serology: IVq8h 100 mg) PO BID 
pneumonia (chest Serum agglutination OR OR 
x-ray: prominent hilar Tissue EM Doxycycline: 2.2 mg/kg Cfprofloxacin: 15 mg/kg (max 
adenopathy) (max 100 mg) IV 500 mg) PO BID 
1)pboidal: fever, q12h 
malaise, abdominal OR 
pain Ciprofloxacin: 15 mg/kg 




15 mg/kg (max 1 g) 
IVq6h 
Botulism Clostridium Afebrile 1 to 5 days Nasal swab? Mouse bioassay Standard CDC trivalent antitoxin None 
botulinum Descending flaccid Ag-ELISA (serotypes A, B, E) 
toxin paralysis DOD heptavalent anti-
Cranial nerve palsies toxin (serotypesA-G) 
Sensation and (lND) 
mentation intact California Department 
of Health inunune 
globulin 
(IND) 
Viral Arenaviridae Febrile prodrome; rapid 4 to 21 days Blood Viral isolation Contact, Supportive care None 
hemor- (e.g., Lassa progression to shock, Serum Ag-EUSA droplet; Ribavirin (arenaviruses): 
rhagic fever) purpura, bleeding RT-PCR consider 30 mg!kg IV initially 
fevers Filoviridae diathesis Serology: airborne if 16 mg/kg IV q6h 
(e.g., Eboia, Ab-EUSA massive x 4 days, then 
Marburg) hemorrhage 8 mg/kg IV q8h 
x 6 days 
(IND) 
·Syndrome expected after aerosol exposure. 
tCDC recommended one or two additional antibiotics for inhalational anthrax in fall 2001 outbreak: rifampin, vancomycin, penicillin or ampicillin, clindamycin, imipenem, or clarithromycin. Recommendations in future 
outbreaks may evolve rapidly, and frequent consultation with local health departments and CDC (1-770-488-7100; www.bt.cdc.gov)is encouraged. 
* Amoxicillln 80 mg/kg/day divided q8h can be substituted if strain proves susceptible. 
CSF, cerebrospinal fluid; DIC, disseminated intravascular coagulation; ELISA, enzyme-linked immullosorbenc assay; IFA, immunofluorescent assay; IND, investigational new drug status; PCR, polymerase chain reaction; RT-
peR, reverse transcriptase polymerase chain reaction. 
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A gram~negative coccobacillus, tularemia is a primarily 
zoonotic disease, but it can infect humans via skin, inha~ 
lation, or mucous membrane contact. Because of its as-
sociation with animal workers, trappers, and insects un~ 
der natural conditions, it has been termed "rabbit fever" 
or "deer fly fever." 
Tidaremia was one of the first bacteria weaponized by 
the United States offensive program in the 1950s, and it 
is thought to be an agent widely researched and devel-
oped by the former USSR, among others. This disease 
may be seen in the form of an ulceroglandular disease or 
typhoidal infection. Naturally occurring cases have oc-
curred in all of the contiguous United States, with an in-
cidence of approximately 200 cases a year. 
Pathogenesis 
Infection can be via the GI tract, mucous membrane, 
ocular or broken skin exposure, or via inhalation of aero~ 
solized bacteria. The latter would be unlikely except in 
the intentional dissemination of the bacteria as a weapon. 
Although tularemia is highly infectious, it is not conta-
gious between humans. 
Clinical Presentation 
Primary typhoidal disease would be the most likely 
manifestation after an intentional dissemination of tulare-
mia via inhalation or ingestion. After an unpredictable 
incubation phase that ranges from 3 to 21 days, there is 
commonly an acute onset of constitutional symptoms 
such as high temperature, malaise, myalgias, and weight 
loss. Lymphadenopathy is not commonly seen. Typhoidal 
disease may progress to pneumonic tularemia in as many 
as 80% of cases. Severe symptoms of chest pain, cough, 
dyspnea, and signs of pneumonia develop. The case fatal-
ity rate is approximately 35% in untreated patients. 
Ulceroglandular disease represents the majority of 
naturally occurring cases, typically in animal handlers, 
hunters, veterinarians, or those exposed to fly bites in the 
outdoors. Symptoms include fever, chills, headache, and 
marked lymphadenopathy in the drainage area of the 
exposure. An ulcerated skin lesion typically occurs at the 
site of exposure. 
About 30% of ulceroglandular disease may progress to 
typhoidal disease. 
In some cases, an ulcerous lesion is not seen; this is 
termed glandular tularemia. 
Less commonly, local inoculation of the eyes and 
mouth may lead to oculoglandular or oropharyngeal 
tularemia, with signs and symptoms consistent with ul-
ceroglandular disease. 
Diagnosis and Laboratory Findings 
As with most biological attacks, maintain a high in-
dex of suspicion for tularemia if epidemiologic analysis 
reveals an abnormal clustering of atypical pneumo-
nia with systemiC illness. A chest x-ray study may dem-
onstrate typical or interstitial pneumonia, possibly with 
pleural effusion. Laboratory studies typically demon-
strate low to moderate leukocytosis «22,000/fJ,L) with 
a normal differential. Bacteria may be cultured and j 
lated from blood, lesion swabbing, sputum, and a~r"­
rates, but may require specific media and precautions if 
tularemia is suspected. Enzyme-linked immunosorbent 
assay (ELISA) serum antibody titers are used to establish 
diagnosis. 
Ditrerential Diagnosis 
Typhoidal tularemia may be difficult to distinguish 
from other severe pulmonary infections such as myco· 
plasma and plague. It may mimic the symptoms of other 
typhoidal illnesses such as malaria, salmonelia, and rick-
ettsial infections as well as influenzal illnesses. The ul-
ceroglandular lesion could be confused with an insect 
bite or noninfectious ulcerous lesion. 
Management 
Gentamicin 2.5 mg/kg IV/IM q8h or streptomycin 
15 mg/kg 1M q 12h (max dose of 2g) are the first line 
treatments for pediatric tularemia. Alternatively, doxcy~ 
cline, ciprofloxacin, or chloramphenicol can be used 
(see Table 37-2). Doxycycline 2.2 mg/kg/dose IV q12h 
«100 mg dose) or ciprofloxacin 15 mg/kg (max 
500 mg) IV q12h OR chloramphenicol 25 mg/kg 
1 g) q6h IV are acceptable substitutes. 
Doxycycline 2.2 mg/kg PO twice daily «100 
dose) for 2 weeks is used for prophylaxis of tularemi:a. 
Alternatively, ciprofloxacin 15 mg/kg PO BID (max 
of 19) for 2 weeks can be used. 
A live attenuated product is available as a vmocil1alior. 
for laboratory workers or those at high risk for tularemitl. 
The cau..'iative agent of smallpox is the Orthodox 
Variola, which takes two forms, major and minor. 
riola major causes the more serious illness. ' 
outbreaks have occurred for thousands of yeac-; 
history, most recently inAfrica in the mid-1970s in 
lia. It is a highly contagious disease that has a case 
rate of approximately 30%. 
Endemic disease was eliminated by 1980 through 
IOnumental vaccination efforts by the World Health 
Organization, among others. After eradication, the public 
was told that the only world samples that remained were 
secure in the United Stat~s and Russia. Unfortunately, ac-
countability of the samples is suspect, and the integrity 
of the few remaining research stockpiles of the virus is 
unknown. It is known to be a studied agent by other 
countries, including the former Soviet Union, where it 
was allegedly heavily studied and mass produced as a 
biological weapon. As much as 20 tons of weaponized 
smallpox, in violation of the 1972 International Biologi-
cal Weapons Convention, may have been produced. This 
covert facility reportedly studied and weaponized many 
other biological agents, including most of those dis-
cussed in this chapter. 
Smallpox represents a potent BT agent because of its 
virulence and its contagiousness. The pediatric and ado-
lescent population would be entirely disease-naive, now 
that routine vaccination has been stopped for decades. It 
is uncertain what level of protection of the previously 
immunized adult population would experience, if any. 
Pathogenesis 
Smallpox infection occurs via the inhalation of aero-
. 'iolized virus, or possibly by indirect contact with con-
(aminated fomites. 
Clinical Presentation 
The incubation period of smallpox (Variola major) 
is 7 to 19 days, after which entirely nonspecific flulike 
symptoms develop, including fever, headache, myalgias, 
vomiting, fatigue, and an erythematous rash. This is reli-
ably followed 2 to 3 days later with a rash to the face, 
hands, and forearm consisting of macular lesions. The 
mucosal surfaces may be affected. Over the next week 
the lesions become deep-seated and pustular, typically in 
a centrifugal pattern that spares the trunk. Up to 
2 weeks after symptoms develop the pustules develop 
into scabs, which then slough to reveal a depressed scar 
similar to the one seen at the site of vaccination in adults 
who were immunized. 
Patients are considered contagious until all scabs have 
separated naturally. 
Other presentations of smallpox besides the one de-
scribed herein can occur. Hemorrhagic smallpox is 
generally fatal within a week and rapidly progresses 
through symptoms of fever, headache, and abdominal 
pain. A petechial rash then develops involving the skin 
and mucous membranes. This disease may resemble the 
presentation of a viral hemorrhagic fever. Malignant 
smallpox may involve flat, nonpustular lesions that de-
velop after the prodromal phase of the illness. 
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Variola minor infections have approximately the 
same timetable but may have more subdued leSions, 
milder syndromic symptoms, and a lower case fatality 
rate. The illness may be variably subdued in previously 
immunized individuals. 
Diagnosis and Laboratory Findings 
The presentation of any illness with synchronous de-
velopment of pustular lesions should raise a high index 
of suspicion, as should any unusual cluster of diseases in-
volving skin leSions. Prompt evaluation and identification 
of suspected cases is vital due to the threat of continued 
exposures from infected persons. Diagnosis is typically by 
electron microscopy of vesicular scrapings, although sil-
ver staining may also be utilized. Identification may also be 
via polymerase chain reaction. Specimens should be han-
dled at one of a small number of federailaboratories with 
the highest biosafety precautions. 
Differential Diagnosis 
Smallpox can be difficult to differentiate from other 
vesicular illnesses such as varicella (chickenpox), which 
typically does not present with a centrifugal distribution 
of lesions or synchronous leSion development. Monkey-
pox (a milder relative of variola), cowpox, and other skin 
diseases such as erythema multiforme or contact derma-
titis can also appear in a similar fashion. Interestingly, the 
United States experienced its first monkeypox cases in 
2003 in the U.S. Midwest, which initially caused signifi-
cant alarm in the medical community, which appropri-
ately initially considered smallpox as the causative agent. 
Management 
A case of smallpox would represent a public health 
emergency of the highest order. Because the disease is 
not treatable, case control would focus on the isolation 
of symptomatic patients, the quarantine of exposed or 
possibly exposed individuals, and the widespread vacci-
nation of any potential contacts to reduce the possibility 
of secondary transmission. Vaccination may prevent the 
development of diseases up to 3 to 4 days after inocula-
tion. The use of antiviral medications such as cidofovir is 
being investigated for use in smallpox. 
Preexposure or postexposure prophylaxis is possible 
for smallpox. Specific populations at risk may be vacci-
nated (military, some high-risk health care workers), 
although this practice is not currently widespread. Live 
vaccinia virus is used at this time for vaccination 01ence 
the origin of the word); however, there are tissue cell 
culture vaccines in development. There are many rare but 
serious complications to vaccination, including the pos-
sibility of cardiac disease and death, which led to the 
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cessation of the initiative to broadly vaccinate first re-
sponders in 2003. If smallpox exposure is suspected, 
however, there are few if any contramdications to the use 
of the vaccine. Passive immunopropbylaxis consisting of 
vaccinia immune globulin is used to treat severe side ef-
fects of the vaccination process. As mentioned earlier, a 
vaccine is prepared, but it is not available for civilian use 
at this time. It is stockpiled in the Strategic National Stock-
pile (SNS) for emergency use by the CDC. 
Many RNA viruses can cause a febrile hemorrhagic 
illness that affects the microvascular system. These in-
clude Ebola, Marburg, yellow fever, dengue, and Lassa 
virus. All can be rapidly progressive and lethal, and all 
have been suspected as potential BT agents. 
Most viral hemorrhagic fever (VHF) viruses are en-
demic in certain equatorial regions, although it is not 
known what the nonhuman animal reservoir is in all 
cases. VHF viruses are not highly contagious because 
they are not transmitted by air through respiratory se-
cretions. There is significant concern that either engi-
neering or spontaneous mutation could lead to a strain 
of VHF that is airborne. An outbreak of Ebola species 
reston occurred in the United States in 1989 in im-
ported primates in Reston, Virginia. This particular strain 
was fortunately not pathogenic in humans, but frighten-
ingly this strain was likely transmitted by airborne 
means. This incident inspired the book The Hot Zone by 
Richard Preston. 
Four families of VHF exist and can cause a variety of 
illnesses: 
Arenavirus: Machupo, Lassa, Argentine hemor-
rhagic fever 
Bunyavirus: hantavirus, Congo-Crimean fever, 
Rift Valley fever 
Filovirus: Ebola, Marburg 
Flavivirus: yellow fever, dengue 
Table 37-3 
Pathogenesis 
There are a variety of infectious route and animal res-
ervoirs specific to each virus family (Table 37-3). 
The common pathophysiology is a degradation of the 
vascular system and coagulopathy, which is described 
below and is highiy lethal. 
Clinical Presentation 
The general syndrome of VHF includes some or all A 
the following symptoms: microvascular degradation, c()-
agulopathy, complement system activation, fever, ruyal-
gias, weakness, conjtIDctival injection, hypotension, flush-
ing, petechial lesions, and edema. These may progress to 
shock, systemic hemorrhage, DIC, and renal or multisys-
tem organ failure. Specific VHF viruses may emphasize 
one or more of these signs and symptoms. 
Diagnosis and Laboratory Findings 
A high index of suspicion would be required to iden-
tify a VHF BT attack in its early phases. Clusters of un-
usual diseases will likely be the first signs. Not all cases 
of VHF will be a BT attack, because these diseases are 
endemiC in some locations. A thorough travel and expo-
sure risk history is an important component of the initial 
history and physical examination. Thrombocytopenia 
and leukopenia are typical, with some exceptions. Ele-
vated liver function tests, proteinuria, and hematuria may 
be seen. ELiSAs may provide rapid diagnosis of the vire-
mia in some cases. Viral culture may also diagnose a sus-
pected VHF virus. 
Differential Diagnosis 
The differential diagnosis includes parasitemia (e.g., 
malaria), typhOid fever, saimonellosis, leptospirosis, ri'ck':tt-, 
siosis, shigellosis, gram-negative sepsis, leukemia, systemic, 
Type of Viral 
Hemorrhagic 










Inhaled dust contaminated with 
rodent waste 
Inhaled dust contaminated with 
rodent waste, bite from vector 
Infectious body fluids, 
respiratory route 
Bite from vector 
Central America, West Africa 
Africa, Europe,Asia 
Africa (periodically emerges) 
lupus erythematosus (SLE), idiopathic thrombocytopenic 
purpura (ITP), and others. 
Management 
Acute Disease 
Because there is no cure for VHF, isolation and inten~ 
sive care management are the mainstays of treatment. 
Intravenous fluids, blood products, pressor agents, and 
invasive' monitoring will likely be necessary. Case control 
is focused on the isolation of symptomatic patients and 
their infectious byproducts. Negative pressure isolation 
is required. 
Some VHF virus patients may benefit from ribavirin 
use. Argentine hemorrhagic fever patients may benefit 
from convalescent serum use. 
Prophylaxis 
None is available. Exposure prevention is essential. 
Vaccination 
Vaccination is limited to the yellow fever vaccine. See 
the CDC's recommendations at www.cdc.gov for cur-
rent guidelines regarding dosage and usage for interna~ 
tional travel. 
Departing from the live agents described above, tox~ 
ins are nonliving, noninfectious but highly poisonous bi~ 
ological substances that can incapacitate or kill in min-
ute quantities. 
Toxins hold the potential to be highly effective weap-
ons if efficiently dissemioated. They are limited by their 
stability in the environment. Some of them can be made 
from common pathogens and substances. The toxins 
thought to pose the highest risk are discussed here. 
Botulinum Toxin 
This is one of the most potent neurotoxins formed by 
the spore-formiog bacteria Clostridium botulinum. It is 
thought to have been produced in massive quantities by 
several nations and terrorist groups. Inhaled or ingested 
toxin produces symptoms identical to food-borne botu~ 
lism. A Category A agent, the toxin blocks neuromuscular 
transmission by inhibiting acetylcholine release (presynap-
tic inhibition). It can be inhaled or ingested. Clinical pre-
sentation may consist of cranial nerve palsies (diplopia, 
ptosis, dysphagia, dysphonia) fbllowed by symmetrical de-
scending flaccid muscle paralysis. Respiratory failure may 
take place. Autonomic effects (mydriasis, ileus, constipa-
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tion, dry mouth) may manifest. Victims may have a tran-
siently positive edrophonium (Tensilon) test, and their CSF 
examination is typically nom1.al. The differential diagnosis 
includes GltilIaio-Barre syodrome, tick paralysis, myasthe-
nia gravis, nerve agent, and atropine poisoning. Naturally 
occurring food-borne botulism is common, so not all cases 
will be acts of terrorisnl. Inhaled Botulinum poisoning 
may also be seen in infants in certain geographic areas. 
Respiratory support and dependent care may be required 
for up to several months. Antitoxin (BAD is available and 
neutralizes circulating toxin but will not reverse symp-
toms. A vaccine is available but not to the general public. 
Prophylactic treatment with BAT is not recommended. 
Staphylococcus aureus Enterotoxin B (SEB) 
SEB is a bacterially produced toxin that is commonly 
encountered as a food-borne illness. As a weapon, the 
toxin was produced by the U.S. offensive program (and 
likely others) before 1969. This bacterial "superantigen" 
can cause an intense systemic inflammatory response via 
direct T-cell stimulation, typically after ingestion or possi-
bly inhalation. A febrile respiratory syndrome and/or 
pulmonary edema would be expected after inhalation of 
the toxin. In food poisoning or GI toxicity, the pulmonary 
symptoms would likely be absent, and a high temperature 
would be expected. The differential diagnosis includes 
anthrax, tularemia, Q fever, plague, hantavirus, chlamydial 
pneumonia, and mustard or phosgene gas. Treatment fo-
cuses on supportive care through the acute phase of the 
disease. There is no vaccine or antitoxin at this time. 
T2 Mycotoxins 
These are toxic compounds produced by Fusarium, 
a grain mold, and are suspected as the active agent in 
"yellow rain." Effects are similar to those of radiation ex-
posure; consequently, Fusarium is considered a "radio-
mimetic agent." If skin is contacted, burning, redness, le-
Sions, and subsequent necrosis may occur. Respiratory 
symptoms include pain, sneezing, epistaxis, wheeZing, 
cough, and hemoprysis. Common GI symptoms are vom-
iting and diarrhea. The agent likely inhibits protein and 
nucleic acid synthesis and inhibits mitochondrial func-
tion. These agents can be inhaled, ingested, or absorbed 
transdermally. Any exposure may lead to weakness and 
ataxia progressing to shock and death in minutes to days. 
A differential diagnosis should include mustard gas or 
other vesicant agents, SEB, and ricin. An exposure history 
may include a reported contact with an oily aerosolized 
liquid. Mass spectrometry may be useful in confirming 
diagnosis. Supportive treatment is the focus, and GI de-
contamination may be used if the agent is ingested. 
There is no vaccine or antitoxin is available. Prompt skin 
decontamination is essential if suspected. 
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Ricin 
Ricin is a cytotoxin extracted from castor beans, which 
are available worldwide. It works by inhibiting protein 
synthesis, leading to necrosis of the epitheliailining of the 
stomach and lungs. It may cause DIC and microvascular 
injury Fever, chest tightness, cough, dyspnea, nausea, joint 
pain; lung inflammation, cyanosis, cough, and respiratory 
failure from acute respiratory distress syndrome (ARDS) 
would be expected. Symptoms may be dose-related. The 
disease should be suspected in cases of an onset of pul-
monary symptoms in a geographic cluster of patients. 
Symptoms would not improve with antibiotics. A wid-
ened mediastinum would likely be absent, which may 
help differentiate ricin from anthrax. Chest x-ray study 
may show bilateral infiltrates, and laboratory results may 
indicate a leukocytosis with a left shift. EliSA may con-
firm a diagnosis when used on respiratory secretions. Ri-
cin is difficult to separate from some of the other agents 
with similar presentation, such as SEB toxin, Q fever, tula-
remia, plague, anthrax, phosgene gas, or any pulmonary 
irritant (e.g., chlorine gas). Care is focused on supportive 
measures, espeCially of the respiratory system. GI decon-
tamination should be considered. No antitoxin or vaccine 
is available. 
MAJOR POINTS 
In-hoSPital InfectiOUS Disease specialists and local 
health departments can prOVide gUidance on initial 
isolation, management, testing, and response to a 
suspected or confirmed biological threat. 
Major potential agents of biological terrorism include 
anthrax, plague, smallpox, tularemia, botulism, 
and viral hemorrhagic fevers. 
Many BT agents will present With common symptoms, 
making them difficult to diagnose at first. A thor-
ough history and physical' exam as well"as an 
awareness of the characteristic signs and sym.p-
toms of each Df these agents will be helpful in 
making a diagnosis. 
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